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RECENT CASES
ANTITRUST-PLAINTIFF IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTION HELD
IN PAKI DELICTO AND THEREFORE WITHOUT STANDING TO
COMPLAIN OF INJURIES SUSTAINED BY AN AGREEMENT TO
WHICH HE WAS A PARTY AND WHICH CONTAINED TERMS
ALLEGEDLY IN VIOLATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS. Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp. (7th Cir. 1967).
In 1955 International Parts Corporation originated a franchise plan
under which a nationwide network of automotive shops specializing
in the Midas exhaust system was established. The franchise was a
contract for the purchase of Midas products for resale from a retail
outlet licensed by Midas. According to the agreement, holders of the
franchise were required to purchase all exhaust system components
from Midas. The sale of any competitor's exhaust parts or the sale of
any automobile parts other than exhaust system components was
forbidden. Plaintiffs obtained franchises in 1955 and 1956 and each
operated from four to six shops. After approximately four years of
association with Midas, three of the plaintiffs left the franchise plan
for the less restrictive program of a competitor. Midas terminated the
franchise of the fourth plaintiff without objection from him.
Plaintiffs brought suit under Section 4 of the Clayton Act for
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act; 2 Section 3 of the
Clayton Act; 3 and Section 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act.4 The specific counts were: (1) the defendants5
1 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found
or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall re-
cover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attoney's fee.
2 Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal ....
3 Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods ... for
use, consumption, or resale within the United States . .. or fix a price...
on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a competitor or competitors
of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for
sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
4 Clayton Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
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engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade; (2) the terms of the
franchise agreement illegally restricted plaintiffs' operation of their
muffler shops by requiring that all exhaust parts be purchased from
defendants even though certain components were available at a lower
cost from defendants' competitors; and (3) the defendants practiced
price discrimination against the plaintiffs while Midas franchise
holders.
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment6 on all counts. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, held, affirmed as to counts 1 and 2, reversed and remanded as
to count 3: Because of their voluntary entry into and successful
participation in the franchise agreement, and the fact that each
sought to perpetuate the cause of his alleged injury by acquiring
additional franchises, plaintiffs were in pari delicto07 and therefore
without standing to complain about violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act. A further basis for
dismissal of count 1 was the nonexistence of a conspiracy to violate
the antitrust laws.8 As to count 3, there were genuine issues of fact
precluding disposition by summary judgmentY Perma Life Mufflers,
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . and
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of
them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered ....
5 "The defendants were International Parts Corporation, three of its subsidiary
corporations, plus six individual officers or agents of the corporate defendants." Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692, 693 (7th Cir. 1967).
I FED. R. Cr. P. 56(b).
7 BLAcs'S LAW DIcrIONARY 898 (4th ed. 1951).
IN PAns DELicTo POTIOR EsT CONDrro POSSIDENTS, [DFENDNTIS.] In
a case of equal or mutual fault [between two parties] the condition of the
party in possession [or defending] is the better one.
8 376 F.2d at 699.
[N]o conspiracy existed as a matter of law. . . . [T]he corporate and indi-
vidual defendants were a single business entity through which a family
business was operated .... While we agree with plaintiff that subsidiary
corporations may under certain circumstances 'conspire' to violate the anti-
trust laws, the record before us indicates by uncontested facts that no such
conspiracy was present here."
9 376 F.2d at 700-03. The triable issues of fact were whether plaintiffs were free to
handle any products other than those purchased from Midas, notwithstanding the
exclusive dealing franchise agreement; whether Midas parts were sufficiently dis-
similar in grade and quality from defendants' parts to justify a price differential
between Midas franchise holders and other customers of defendant; and whether plain-
tiffs competed with other purchasers of Midas brand exhaust parts.
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Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1966),
petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3174 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1967) (No.
733).
The conclusion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals that
plaintiffs were in pari delicto is not surprising when considered in
conjunction with the policy, which the court has termed "the Crest
rule,"10 set forth in the 1966 decision of Crest Auto Supplies, Inc. v.
Ero Manufacturing Co." In Crest the court stated:
Plaintiffs refer to a "feeling" in "all the Courts" against the
pari delicto rule in private anti-trust cases. The only animus we
detect in the courts on the pari delicto question is directed at pro-
tecting those who are coerced into illegal agreements . . . . But
where a plaintiff participates freely in the alleged anti-trust conduct,
the pari delicto rule precludes recovery.... [T] he doctrine that a
plaintiff who is a voluntary party to the allegedly illegal agreement
which forms the basis for the anti-trust suit cannot recover thereon
was "firmly established in earlier cases" and still remains to be given
effect in appropriate actions. 12
The Crest rule was reaffirmed by the Seventh Circuit in the 1967
case of Florists' Nationwide Telephone Delivery Network v. Florists'
Telegraph Delivery Association.3 However, neither Crest nor Flor-
ists' cited the 1964 United States Supreme Court case of Simpson v.
Union Oil Co.'4 Perma Life is the first time that the Seventh Circuit
has examined its policy with respect to pari delicto in the light of
Simpson.
In Simpson, plaintiff wanted to operate a Union Oil service station.
To achieve this goal he entered into lease and consignment agree-
ments with Union Oil. While both agreements were terminable by
either party at the end of any year, the consignment agreement ended
10 376 F.2d at 698 n.4.
11 360 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1966).
12 360 F.2d at 900 (footnotes omitted).
13 371 F.2d 263, 267-68 (7th Cir. 1967).
The core of FTD's defense . . . is . . . that FNTDN's purpose and conduct
preclude it from recovery on its damage claim and bar it from equitable relief
under the 'clean hands' doctrine.
Such defense, if established, would so bar FNTDN from both recovery of
damages and injunctive relief. .... Cf. Crest Auto Supplies, Inc. v. Ero
Manufacturing Company . . . . [Although factually distinguishable, Crest
Auto Supplies exemplifies an application of the 'clean hands' doctrine which
is pertinent here.
14 377 U.S. 13 (1964). See generally, 6 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rav. 318 (1965); 44
NEB. L. REv. 635 (1965); 17 STAN. L. REv. 519 (1965); 43 TExAs L. REv. 659
(1965); 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 293 (1965); 10 VILL. L. REv. 366 (1965); 50 A.B.A.J.
869 (1964); 14 Da PAUL L. REv. 165 (1964); 33 FORDHAM L. REv. 336 (1964); 78
HARV. L. REv. 279 (1964); 16 SYRAcusa L. RaV. 116 (1964).
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upon the termination of the lease. After several months, because of
the competition, plaintiff wanted to sell at prices lower than those
specified in the consignment agreement. When plaintiff lowered his
prices, Union Oil cancelled his lease and consequently terminated the
consignment agreement. Plaintiff brought a private antitrust action
alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act15 and Section 3
of the Clayton Act. 6 The district court granted Union Oil's motion
for summary judgment holding plaintiff was without standing to sue
because he had voluntarily agreed to sell at prices fixed by Union
Oil.17 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating:
Assuming for argument only that the consignment program is
illegal .... [and agreeing] with Simpson that a cause of action in
a private antitrust suit for treble damages is a tort action .... [T] he
law does not permit an individual to see and observe a tort violation
and then to voluntarily put himself in a position where a tort cause
of action would accrue and because of which he might become a
litigant.1S
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the question as to
whether plaintiff suffered any damages.
The Perma Life court takes the view that Simpson spoke not at all
on the defense of in pari delicto, stating: "The Court does not men-
tion pari delicto and we think it did not intend to annihilate a princi-
ple so long embedded in the law."'19 While it is true that a reversal of
a summary judgment decision has only the effect of declaring the ex-
istence of triable issues of fact and has no effect on the legal issues
involved,20 in Simpson the district court considered the damage ques-
tion closed because plaintiff had voluntarily consented to the alleged
illegal terms in the consignment agreement. The Supreme Court in
declaring that an issue did exist as to damages, necessarily rejected
the application of the in pari delicto theory.
21
15 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
16 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
17 311 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1963).
18 Id. at 768.
'9 376 F.2d at 697.
20 5 Am. JUR. 2d Appeal and Error § 955 (1962).
21 In Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 1961 Trade Cas. 77,693 (N.D. Cal. 1960), the
court granted summary judgment to defendant and stated at 77,698 that, "[bjoth the
doctrine of pari delicto and volenti non fit injuria would afford an adequate defense
to . . ." plaintiff's right to assert damages. In affirming the summary judgment the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 892. 311 F.2d at
768. This has lead various writers to submit the view that the Ninth Circuit considered
the defense of consent to a tort in its deision. See 78 HAv. L. REv. 279 (1964); Note,
In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suit, 78 HARv. L. REv.
[Vol. 5
RECENT CASES
Rejection of'the defense may occur in circumstances where the
defense would otherwise be applied if one of the following condi-
tions were present: (1) the party against -whom the defense is
asserted was coerced or induced by fraud into the illegal agreement; 22
or (2) if public policy required that relief be given notwithstanding
the plaintiff's voluntary participation. 5 The particular exception
found in Simpson is not clear. Despite this lack of clarity, this case
has been regarded as the beginning of the demise of the defense in
private antitrust actions on one hand,24 and as a possible expansion of
the concept of coercion on the other.2 5
The expanded coercion theory rests on the proposal that:
[T] he Court viewed [plaintiff's] action as having been economically
coerced, on the theory that nonparticipation was not a meaningful
alternative. If so, Simpson goes beyond previous decisions, which
permitted economic coercion to vitiate the similar defense of in
pari delicto only where the alternative to participation in the illegal
scheme was loss of investment.26
The difficulty with this view is that the facts in Simpson do not
indicate why nonparticipation was not "meaningful." If plaintiff
had not participated there is no indication that he would have been
injured economically or otherwise. At worst he would have suffered
only disappointment. However, the facts do disclose that plaintiff
had no choice in the manner of his participation with Union Oil.
2 7
He could do business on their terms or not at all. There was no
1241 (1965). But, Circuit Judge Cummings in his dissent in lPerma Life indicates that
the defense applied in Simpson was in pari delicto, stating:
A close study of the Simpson case, including the briefs filed therein, convinces
me that the Supreme Court would not accept the in pari delicto defense in
Perma Life.... In Simpson, the Ninth Circuit used the in pari delicto theory
to deny plaintiff any recovery. That point was fully briefed in the Supreme
Court which reversed....
376 F.2d at 704.
With respect to the question of voluntary entry of plaintiffs into the agreements in
Simpson and Perma Life, this possible difference is one without a distinction, for
"[even assuming that consent might be a valid defense to such a claim at common
law, a finding of voluntariness is as essential an element of consent as it is in
establishing in pari delicto .. " 78 HARv. L. REv. at 1247.
22 17 Am. JUR. 2d Contracts § 229 (1964).
2 17 Am. JUR. 2d Contracts § 221 (1964).
The rule which limits the enforcement of rights growing out of illegal
agreements is generally applied only in cases where the parties are in pari
delicto. Except when public policy requires that relief be given to such a
plaintiff ....
24 20 OKLA. L. Rav. 97 (1967).
25 78 HARv. L. REV. 279 (1964).
28 Id. at 282.
27 311 F.2d at 766, 768.
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opportunity to bargain. over the terms of their relationship. Plaintiff
did not conceive or sponsor the vast distribution system. Plaintiff had
no interest in the success of the antitrust terms of the agreement; he
merely acquiesced to them andhis fault would seem to be slight by
comparison. But the fact of his voluntary participation still remains.
It seems that plaintiff's minimal fault is not enough to relieve him
of in pari delicto if coercion were the test, since coercion requires in-
voluntary action by plaintiff.
Since fraud was not an issue in Simpson, there remains the possi-
bility that in pari delicto was not allowed because public interest
demanded that plaintiff prevail even though he was a voluntary
participant. The Supreme Court has recognized and often referred to
"the public interest in vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws
through the instrumentality of the private treble-damage action. 2
One authority takes the position that the defense of in pari delicto is
enforced rather than barred in aid of public policy against antitrust
agreements. 2 The reasoning is that nonenforcement of the defense
would encourage illegal trade practices by permitting plaintiffs to
recover their losses from these practices.80 Cases cited in support of
this view show that the plaintiff was either a part of the illegal con-
spiracy forming the basis of the claim,"' or instigated the agreement,8 2
or was a party who materially bargained over the contract terms. 3
It is suggested that the above view is limited in that it fails to
consider a class of cases in which the antitrust violation is partic-
ularly harmful to competition and the fault of plaintiff is minimal;
the very situation that existed in Simpson. Under this class of cases
it would seem that the interest of the public would best be served by
allowing plaintiff to prevail in spite of his token acceptance of anti-
28 Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1965); accord,
Radovich v. National Ball League, 352 U.S. 445 (1967); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v.
American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947); see Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469 (1940).
29 See E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRusT ACTIONS 105 (1965);
accord, Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suit, 78
HARv. L. REv. 1241 (1965); Comment, Limiting the Unclean Hands and In Pari
Delicto Defenses in Anti-Trust Suits: An Additional justification, 54 Nw. U.L. REv.
456 (1959).
80 E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 30, at 105.
81 Lehmann Trading Corp. v. J. & H. Stowlow, Inc. 184 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
82 Kershaw v. Kershaw Mfg. Co., 209 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
88 Morny v. Western Union Tel. Co., 40 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); see
Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co., 209
F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953).
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trust terms in the agreement he entered. 4 To deny relief to plaintiff
is to allow continuing injury to competition, to use the public monies
in a prosecutions essentially identical to the private action already
before the court, and to expend the valuable time of the courts in
rehearing essentially the same issues. A suggested test for allowing
the public interest exception to the defense of in pari delicto is that:
(1) the antitrust plan or agreement be one with a substantial poten-
tial for harm or one that has substantially affected competition, and
(2) the fault of plaintiff be minimal in the conception or implementa-
tion of the plan. Such a test would be applicable to Simpson; it would
still allow the defense to be applied in appropriate cases where
plaintiff was a substantial contributor to the scheme; and it would
not require the employment of a legal fiction to find coercion where
plaintiff did not have to enter into the illegal agreement.
If, as suggested above, the public interest exception is the true basis
of the Simpson decision, then the voluntary entry of the Perma Life
plaintiffs into the franchise agreement would not alone be sufficient
to support the defense of in pari delicto. Further inquiry would be
necessary to determine whether plaintiffs were in a position to bargain
over the objectionable terms in the agreement or were, instead, re-
quired to agree to them as a condition of doing any business at all
with defendants.
If the basis of the Simpson decision is that plaintiff was coerced
into the agreement because "nonparticipation was not a meaningful
alternative," 36 then the application of in pari delicto in Perma Life is
even less appropriate than a public interest exception. Plaintiff in
Simpson had the option of associating with Union Oil, or perhaps
with a competing oil company, or with no one at all. Plaintiffs in
Perma Life were in essentially the same position.
Considering the above arguments it would seem that the summary
34 See 6 H. TOULMiN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 587 (1951).
35 Sherman Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction
to prevent and restrain violations of sections 1-7 of this title; and it shall be
the duty of the several United States attorneys, in their respective districts,
under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity
to prevent and restrain such violations ...
Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1964).
Whenever the United States is hereafter injured in its business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws it may sue therefor in
the United States district court for the district in which the defendant
resides ....
36 78 HARv. L. REV. 279, 282 (1964).
1968]
178 SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
judgment in Perma Life granted on the theory that plaintiffs were
in pari delicto with defendants is in conflict with the policy followed
by the Supreme Court in Simpson. If allowed to stand, the Seventh
Circuit view on the defense of in pari delicto will have the effect of
excluding a class of cases from consideration under section 4 of the
Clayton Act. Unless the United States Supreme Court decides other-
wise, it appears that the Seventh Circuit will have closed the door
left open in Simpson.
JON M. JENKINS
